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The Changing Importance of
Ideology, Party, and Region in
Confirmation of Supreme Court
Nominees, 1953-1988
By JOHN D. FELICE* AND HERBERT F. WEISBERG**
The combative and controversial rejection of Robert Bork's
nomination to the Supreme Court has revived attention to the
confirmation process of nominees to the United States Supreme
Court and to the interplay between the executive and legislative
branches of the government. Although confirmation of Supreme
Court nominees is often routine, there are two classic positions
these branches take when controversy does erupt. The president's
traditional argument is that appointments to the Court are the
chief executive's prerogative and that partisanship and ideology
should not intrude into the confirmation process. The Reagan
administration most recently repeated this claim in its severe
criticism of the Senate's politicizing of the Bork nomination. On
the other side, senators opposed to a particular nomination main-
tain that the Senate's power to advise and consent' gives it an
equal role with the president in the appointment process. Pro-
ponents of this latter position point out that the Senate has
refused to confirm 28 of the 145 Supreme Court nominees for-
warded to it over the past two centuries2 and that this is much
higher than the Senate's rejection rate for any other presidential
* Graduate student in Political Science, Ohio State University; B.A., S.U.N.Y.
Buffalo, 1986.
** Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; B.A., University of
Minnesota, 1963; Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1968. The authors wish to thank the
Everett Dirksen Center for Congressional Studies, whose support aided our work on this
project. We also want to acknowledge our appreciation to Lawrence Baum, Gregory
Caldeira, Elliot Slotnick, and John Kilwein for insightful discussions with us on this
topic.
See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2 See H. ABRAnAM, JUSTICS AND PRESIDENTs 39 (2d ed. 1985).
D. Tannenbaum, Senate Confirmation and Controversial Presidential Nomi-
nations: From Truman to Nixon, paper presented at annual meeting of American
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nomination. 3 As Lawrence Tribe has argued, "the upper house
of Congress has been scrutinizing Supreme Court nominees and
rejecting them on the basis of their political, judicial, and eco-
nomic philosophies ever since George Washington was presi-
dent." ' 4 Although only five nominees, including the Fortas
promotion to Chief Justice, have been voted down during the
twentieth century, the Senate reminded Presidents Nixon and
Reagan that the possibility of refusal is ever present. The conflict
between the president and the Senate is in part a dispute over
constitutional interpretation, but it is also partially a question of
how the role of partisanship, ideology, and other factors in past
confirmation battles are interpreted from the historical record.
Of the many observations made following the Bork hearings,
one is particularly important: the Bork proceedings opened the
doors for intensive screening and questioning of future candi-
dates' judicial philosophies and ideological beliefs. While this
may prove to be an accurate observation, individual senators
have, to some degree, always assessed the ideological make-up
of controversial nominations. This article will examine the influ-
ence of ideology, as well as party and region, on Senate voting
in the confirmation of Supreme Court appointments from the
Eisenhower administration through the Reagan years. The article
focuses on each vote separately, examining how the determinants
change in importance from 1953 to 1988.
I. FACTORS AFFECTING CONFIRMATION VOTING
Previous research has already begun to focus on key deter-
minants of the confirmation process. Studies have examined why
some nominees are selected, why some appointments become
controversial, and why some nominations are rejected by the
Senate.
A. Literature Review
The literature suggests that the nominee's ideology ("political
and ideological compatibility") is one of the factors involved in
Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 2-5, 1975, p. 5 reprinted in G.
EDWARDS III, PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE IN CONoRESS (1980).
4 See L. TRmE, GoD SAvE Tins HONORABLE COURT 92 (1985).
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the president's consideration of prospective candidates, along
with their objective merits, the president's personal friendship
with them, and presidential desire to balance representativeness
of the Court.
5
Baum identifies four bases of Senate opposition to nominees:
the strength of the opposition party in the Senate, the timing of
the nomination in a president's term (with last-year nominations
having the most trouble), the "objective qualifications" of the
nominees "as assessed by senators," and the policy preferences
of the nominees. 6 He describes the latter as "the primary source
of Senate opposition to nominations" in the twentieth century. 7
Furthermore, the nominee's positions on particular issues and
ideology are taken into account in confirmation fights. As Abra-
ham states, rejection can occur because of "the nominee's in-
volvement with a visible or contentious issue of public policy
or, simply, opposition to the nominee's perceived political or
sociopolitical philosophy.' '8
Some scholars have looked at the correlates of Senate con-
firmation and rejection of Supreme Court nominees. Scigliano
demonstrated the impact of partisanship on this process. As of
the date of his study, the confirmation rate was 91%70 when the
Senate was controlled by the president's party versus 42% when
his party was in the Senate minority.9 Wasby examined the effect
of year in the president's term. He found that the confirmation
rate was 90% in the first three years of office but less than 67%
in the fourth year.' 0
Segal provided the first multivariate analysis of the historical
record, using a probit analysis" to study the determinants of the
See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 5-6.
'See L. BAUM, TE SUPREME CouRT 47-49 (3d ed. 1989).
Id. at 49.
H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 39 (emphasis added).
'See R. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME CoURtT AND nrE PRESIDENCY 97-98 (1971)
(Politically aligned nominations succeeded on 98 of 108 occasions, while nominations
not politically aligned succeeded only II out of 26 times.).
10 See S. WASBY, THE SUPREME CouRT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 128 (3d
ed. 1988).
11 "Probit [analysis] is a multivariate technique similar to regression in that it
assigns weights to several variables simultaneously while trying to predict the values of
the dependent variable." Segal and Spaeth, If a Supreme Court Vacancy Occurs, Will
the Senate Confirm a Reagan Nominee?, 69 JUDICATURE 186, 189 (1986).
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confirmation of appointments. His final reduced model shows
significant effects for a number of factors: whether the opposi-
tion party controlled the Senate, whether the nominee was a
sitting senator, whether the appointment was in the fourth year
of the president's term, whether the nominee was a member of
the Cabinet, how long the nominee served in the national legis-
lature, and whether the appointment occurred in the twentieth
century.'2 Lemieux and Stewart have also used a logit analysis
3
of the same historical record, emphasizing the closeness of the
party balance on the Court in affecting nomination success.
14
These analyses are important, but they focus on the outcome
of the Senate confirmation process as a dichotomous confirmed/
rejected variable. This article, instead, examines the determinants
at the level of the individual senator voting on the nomination.
The impact of ideology on senators' confirmation voting has
also received some attention in the literature as well. Sulfridge
found that ideology (as measured by Americans for Constitu-
tional Action [ACA] rating scores of the senators' voting re-
cords) relates to the number of conservative votes cast by senators
on the Fortas, Haynsworth, Carswell, and Rehnquist nomina-
tions. 5 Senators voting for Fortas and against the rest had an
average ACA score of 11.9, compared to an average of 73.3 for
those voting against Fortas and for the rest.' 6 On this basis, he
concludes that "the ideological position of a senator is a major
factor in determining how he will vote.' 7 Poole and Rosenthal
12 See Segal, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Insti-
tutional Politics, 49 J. PoL. 998, 1003-05 (1987); see also Segal & Spaeth, If a Supreme
Court Vacancy Occurs, Will the Senate Confirm a Reagan Nominee?, 69 JuDicATURos
187, 189 (1986).
11 Logit analysis assumes that the probability of an event occurring is related in a
nonlinear fashion to a linear combination of independent variables. It is a structural
model similar to linear regression. P. Lemieux & C. Stewart, Advise? Yes. Consent?
Maybe. Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations (1988) (paper presented at
the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.).
For a more detailed discussion of logit,. see J. ALDRICH & F. NELsoN, LIn; PROBA-
BMIrrY, LoGrr, AND PRoBrr MODELS (1984).
14 See P. Lemieux & C. Stewart, Advise? Yes. Consent? Maybe. Senate Confir-
mation of Supreme Court Nominations (1988) (paper presented at the Annual Meetings
of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.).
11 See Sulfridge, Ideology as a Factor in Senate Consideration of Supreme Court
Nominations, 42 J. POL. 560, 560 (1980).
16 See id. at 565-66.
17 Id. at 560, 567.
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relate their ideological scaling of senators voting in 1985 to the
confirmation votes on Haynsworth, Carswell, Bork, and Rehn-
quist's elevation to Chief Justice, finding high predictive suc-
cess.' 8 For example, their model predicts only seven votes
incorrectly on Bork. These studies, however, do not control for
the effects of partisanship and other variables.
Turner has shown that party is the most important predictor
of congressional votes generally.' 9 Two studies of confirmation
voting have introduced explicit controls for party effects. Rohde
and Spaeth created a Guttman scale2° of Senate votes on the
Fortas Chief Justice nomination, Haynsworth, Carswell, and
Rehnquist appointments. 2' The votes scaled with a reproducibil-
ity of .97. They hypothesized that senators' ideology would be
related to their scale positions. Measuring ideology by Conser-
vative Coalition scores, 2' they find a strong relationship between
scale position and liberalism. Controlling for party, they still
find that "it is the degree of liberalism of a senator and not his
party affiliation which is related to his voting on nominations."
23
Songer examined fourteen controversial nominations in this cen-
tury, testing whether votes against confirmation are due to per-
ceived policy disagreement with the nominee. 24 He found that
supporters of the nominee and opponents differed on roll-call
scales in the issue areas that he predicted to be salient, and this
relationship held when party was controlled. 25 He concluded that
when a nomination is controversial, "predicted policy dissatis-
,1 See K. Poole & H. Rosenthal, The Bork Nomination and the Enduring Liberal-
Conservative Conflict (1987) (unpublished paper).
," See J. TuarNR, PARTY AND CONsTrrTUENcY 34 (Studies in Historical and Political
Science-Johns Hopkins University v.69, n.2 1951).
1 Guttman scale analysis, or cumulative scale analysis, assumes that persons who
endorse a more extreme statement "should endorse all less extreme statements if the
statements are to be considered a scale." D. RoEDE & H. SPAETH, SUPREME CoURT
DEcISION MAKING 79 (1976) (quoting Guttman, The Basis for Scalogram Analysis, in
MEASUREMENT AND PREDICTION 62 (S. Stouffer, et al., eds. 1950)). This scale solves
problems of consistency of responses to a series of questions.
11 See id. at 105-06.
12 The Conservative Coalition support score measures the degree of liberalism of
members of Congress and is published annually by Congressional Quarterly, Inc. See
id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
14 See Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the Confirmation of Supreme
Court Nominees, 13 L. & Soc'Y Rav. 927, 930-31 (1979).
See id. at 935-36.
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faction should be regarded as the major cause of most votes
against confirmation. ' 26 This article builds on these studies by
examining the changing effects of party, region, and ideology
on controversial confirmation votes between 1953 and 1988.
B. Hypotheses
Voting on controversial Supreme Court nominations will
reflect ideological, partisan, and regional considerations. The
relative mix of these factors will, however, vary across nomi-
nations because of the differing contexts in which the nomina-
tions take place.
Ideology will be one important criterion affecting how sen-
ators vote on nominees to the Court. As the recent battle over
the Bork nomination illustrates, Supreme Court appointments
can affect the ideological make-up of the Court. As a result,
senators try to assess the judicial philosophy of the nominee.
Liberal senators will be more supportive of liberal nominees,
and conservative senators will be more supportive of conservative
nominees.
Partisanship will also affect voting on Supreme Court nom-
inations. Votes against nominations will generally be concen-
trated in the opposition party, with members of the president's
party rarely voting against confirmation of the nominations.
The effect of presidential support will also be examined.
Senators who generally support the president's program will
likely vote for the nominations at a higher rate than those who
oppose the president's program. This relationship should hold
even when controlling for partisanship.
Regional differences should also be found in voting on con-
firmations. In particular, because of the civil rights movement
and the aftermath of the Brown v. Board of Education27 deci-
sion, Southern senators in the 1950s through 1970s would be
more likely to oppose liberal appointments and more likely to
support conservative appointments. Many of these regional dif-
ferences, however, are expected to be a function of ideology,
and therefore should diminish when ideology is controlled.
16 Id. at 946.
- 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Party, presidential support, and region will likely vary in
their impact on confirmation voting as a reflection of changing
political contexts, but ideology should be the most consistent
factor over time. Thus, senators' ideological records in Congress
will be related to their confirmation voting, even when control-
ling for the other variables.
II. ANALYSIS OI INDIVIDUAL CONFRMATION VOTES
This article will analyze Senate voting on Supreme Court
nominations from 1953 to 1988. A listing of the nominations
during that time period is given in Table 1. As is customary in
legislative roll-call analysis, paired votes and announced posi-
tions are treated the same as actual votes, and this is reflected
in the vote totals in Table 1. Note that the cloture vote on the
filibuster against Fortas is used as a vote on his elevation to
Chief Justice since there was no straight up-or-down vote on his
nomination.
Appointee
Table 1
Supreme Court Nominations, 1953-1988
Vote Date Vote** Opposition
Eisenhower:
Warren, Earl
Harlan, John
Brennan, William
Whittaker, Charles
Stewart, Potter
Kennedy:
White, Byron
Goldberg, Arthur
Johnson:
Fortas, Abe
Marshall, Thurgood,
Mar-01-54 unanimous Langer + few
Southern Democrats
Mar-16-55 80-12 *controversial
Mar-19-57 voice vote Langer and
McCarthy (WI)
Mar-19-57 voice vote none
May-05-59 81-17 *controversial
Apr-11-62 voice vote
Sep-25-62 voice vote
none
Thurmond
Aug-11-65 voice vote Curtis, Thurmond,
and Williams
Aug-30-67 81-15 *controversial
Continued ....
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Table 1 Continued
Appointee
Fortas, Abe (CJ)
Thornberry, Homer
Nixon:
Burger, Warren
Haynsworth, Clement
Carswell, G. Harrold
Blackmun, Harry
Powell, Lewis
Rehnquist, William
Ford:
Stevens, John Paul
Reagan:
O'Connor, Sandra
Rehnquist, Wm. (CJ)
Scalia, Antonin
Bork, Robert
Ginsburg, Douglas
Kennedy, Anthony
Vote Date
Oct-01-68
1968
Jun-06-69 94-03
Nov-21-69
Apr-08-70
May-12-70
Dec-07-71
Dec-10-71
Vote** Opposition
47-48 *(cloture 2/3 vote
required)
not acted moot-no vacancy on
on Court
McCarthy (MN)
Nelson, Young
*rejected
*rejected
none
Harris
*controversial
none
none
*controversial
none
*rejected
none
Dec-17-75 99-00
Sep-21-81
Sep-17-86
Sep-17-86
Oct-23-87
1987
Feb-03-88
100-0
66-33
99-00
42-58
withdrawan
99-00
45-55
47-52
100-0
97-01
71-27
*Nominations included in the main analysis in this paper.
**Vote shown includes paired votes and announced positions.
Altogether, there were 24 nominations made during this pe-
riod, 3 of which were withdrawn. The Senate took recorded
votes on 16 of these nominations-counting the Fortas cloture
vote. Nine of these votes were controversial, with more than
10% opposition. Three decisions were negative, plus the Fortas
elevation, which failed to receive the extra-size majority needed
to invoke cloture. This article will concentrate on these 9 con-
troversial votes.
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Analysis of these votes requires a consideration of the ideo-
logical positions of the appointments. Haynsworth, Carswell,
Rehnquist, and Bork were conservative nominations by presi-
dents committed to adding conservative members to the Court.
Marshall and Fortas were clearly liberal appointments. The Har-
lan and Stewart appointments, however, are more ambiguous to
interpret ideologically. Their judicial philosophy or ideology
would generally be considered moderate or even moderate-con-
servative. Within the political context of the 1950s, however,
they were seen by Southern conservatives as likely supporters of
the Brown2 decision. Their nominations were regarded as liberal
appointments, and Harlan was characterized as "ultra-liberal.
'29
Therefore, they will be included in the analysis that follows as
liberal nominations.
The analysis will begin by examining the separate effects of
ideology, 0 party,3' region, 32 and presidential support33 on con-
firmation voting.
3 4
See id.
2 See H. ABAHA1 , supra note 2, at 260.
" Senators' ideology is based on their conservative coalition scores as reported by
Congressional Quarterly. These scores have been adjusted for absences by dividing the
conservative coalition support scores by the sum of the senator's conservative coalition
support and opposition scores. These scores are not available for 1955, the year of the
Harlan appointment.
11 Party is routine, except for a few independents and party switchers. James
Buckley is counted as a Republican, and Harry Byrd, Jr. is counted as a Democrat.
Strom Thurmond is coded as Democrat for the votes during the 1950s and Republican
thereafter.
11 Region follows the 11 states of the Confederate South. See infra note 34.
33 Presidential support is measured by Congressional Quarterly's presidential sup-
port scores, with a similar correction for absences.
34 Congressional Quarterly did not report conservative coalition and presidential
support scores in some years for Senators who left Congress before the end of the
session or who were incapacitated, which removed three Senators from parts of the
analysis reported infra. The Congressional Quarterly scores through 1971 were obtained
from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research; neither the
Consortium nor Congressional Quarterly is responsible for any interpretations given
here.
The reader may note that the results in this paper differ from those in an earlier
version. See H. Weisberg & J. Felice, An Ideological Model of Senate Voting in Supreme
Court Nominations (1988) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association, Chicago). The differences are totally due to shifting the
definition of the South from the 14-state South used by the National Election Studies
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A. Separate Effects
Table 2 shows the votes of senators on each controversial
confirmation by party and region, and trichotomized versions
of ideology and presidential support.35 Summary percentages are
provided at the bottom of the table.
Table 2
Levels of Senate Support for Controversial Nominations
TOTAL
Harlan 85%
Stewart 83%
Marshall 84%
Fortas 49%
Haynsworth 45%
Carswell 47%
Rehnquist 72%
Rehnquist (CJ) 67%
Bork 42%
Nominations by
Republican presi-
dents 63%
Nominations by.
Democratic presi-
dents 67%
Liberal nominees 75%
Conservative
nominees 55%
IDEOLOGY
Lib Mod
100% 79%
100% 96%
96% 66%
3% 24%
0% 42%
23% 84%
4% 65%
0% 21%
99% 79% 44o
6% 43% 93%
PARTY REGION PRES SUPPORT
Cons Dem Rep South North Low Mod High
- 79% 96% 50% 97% 33% 82% 100%
69% 73% 100% 23% 100% 84% 64% 100%
60% 77% 97% 30% 99% 50% 84% 89%
3% 63% 28% 10% 61% 0% 63% 100
90% 33% 60% 91% 32% 40ro 41o 82%
95% 30o 70% 82% 38% 0%5 54,o 100%
100% 56% 93% 96% 66% 34%0 91% 100%
100% 34% 96% 91%qo 60% 1805 96% 100%
78% 4% 87% 27% 46% 50,o 90% 100o
44% 86% 66% 62%5
70% 61% 20% 80%
28%5 89%
77% 48%
Key:
-Measures are not available.
to the 11-state confederate South. This shift is appropriate, since senators from states
like Maryland and Oklahoma do not necessarily share reactions with senators from the
solid south. This changed definition leads to more emphasis on region in explaining
voting on the confirmations of Harlan, Stewart, and Marshall.
11 For the ideology column in Table 2, adjusted Conservative Coalition scores are
divided into liberal (0-29%), moderate (30-70%), and conservative (71-100%). For pres-
idential support, the categories are low (0-49%), moderate (50-79%), and high (80-
100%).
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Starting with ideology, the senators who voted most with the
conservative coalition supported conservative nominations-
Haynsworth, Carswell, Rehnquist, Rehnquist for Chief Justice,
and Bork-93% of the time compared to 44% of the time for
the controversial liberal nominations of the period-Stewart,
Marshall, and Fortas. By contrast, the senators who voted least
with the conservative coalition supported conservative nomina-
tions 6% of the time compared to 99% of the time for the three
liberal appointments. Thus, ideology had a large impact on
confirmation voting during this 36-year period.
Party differences are also visible in confirmation voting. As
summarized at the bottom of Table 2, Republican senators sup-
ported nominations by Republican presidents 86% of the time
compared to 44% support of those nominations by Democratic
senators. Democratic senators supported the two controversial
nominations-Marshall and Fortas for chief justice-by a Dem-
ocratic president (Johnson) 70% of the time compared to 61%
of the time for Republican senators.
Additionally, region has had an impact on confirmation
voting. Overall, the South supported liberal nominations only at
a 28% rate, while the non-South supported these same nomi-
nations at 89%. The non-South supported conservative nomi-
nations just 48% of the time, while the South supported them
at a 77% level. The South supported nominations of Republican
presidents at a 66% rate, compared to 20% support of appoint-
ees of Democratic presidents. The difference is less dramatic for
Northern senators: they supported Republican appointments at
a 62% rate compared to 80% for Democratic nominations.
Republican appointees were supported at about the same rate in
the North and the South, while Democratic appointees received
four times as much support among Northerners as Southerners.
Table 3 shows the correlations of these variables with the
confirmation votes. Three major correlation patterns are evident.
Region was the strongest correlate of vote on the first three
nominations-Harlan, Stewart, and Marshall-with the North
being more supportive than the South. Ideology is the second
strongest correlate on those votes when we have a measure of
ideology, with liberals more supportive,
1988-89] .519
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Table 3
Correlations with Confirmation Voting
Presidential
Nomination Ideology Party Region Support
Harlan - .25*** -.58*** .39***
Stewart -. 36*** .33*** -. 85*** .14
Marshall - .48*** .26*** - .77*** .20*
Fortas -. 83*** -. 34*** -. 43*** .76***
Haynsworth - .79*** .27*** .49*** .32***
Carswell - .85*** .39*** .37*** .75***
Rehnquist - .78*** .42*** .28*** .68***
Rehnquist(CJ) - .87*** .66*** .27*** .82***
Bork -. 71*** .84*** -.16"** .87***
Key:
*<.05
*<.0I
**< .001
-Data not available.
All values are Pearson r correlations.
On the next set of nominations-Fortas, Haynsworth, Car-
swell, and the two Rehnquist votes-ideology correlated most
with vote, with liberals more supportive of Fortas and conser-
vatives more supportive of the rest. On Haynsworth, region was
the second largest correlate, with Southerners more supportive.
On the other votes, presidential support has the second largest
correlation, with supporters of the president always more sup-
portive of confirmation.
The Bork nomination has the most distinctive pattern: pres-
idential support has the highest correlation, party second, and
ideology a strong third. Thus, the correlations show a shift from
regional voting on Supreme Court confirmations in the 1950s
through the mid-1960s, to ideological voting from the late 1960s
through the mid-1980s, and then to partisan voting in the late
1980s.
[Vol. 77
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Table 3 is also useful in testing the earlier hypotheses. Ide-
ology was predicted to have the largest impact on Supreme Court
confirmation votes. Indeed, ideology correlated significantly with
each of these controversial confirmation votes. It was the second
highest correlate of vote on the Stewart and Marshall nomina-
tions, but became the most important beginning with the Fortas
nomination. Ideology fell to the third largest correlation with
the Bork vote.
Party was predicted to affect voting, with members of the
president's party more supportive of confirmations than mem-
bers of the opposition party. According to Table 3, party was
significantly related to voting on all of the confirmations, with
the relationship achieving its highest values for the two Reagan
nominations. The signs of the party correlations show that Re-
publicans were more supportive than were Democrats of each
nomination, except for the elevation of Fortas. Looking at dif-
ferences between the president's party and the opposition party,
the president's party was generally more supportive of the nom-
inations. The sole exception was the Marshall nomination, when
Democrats supported him at a lower rate than Republicans (77%
versus 97%) because of Southern Democratic opposition to the
first appointment of a black to the Supreme Court.
Presidential support was also expected to affect voting. The
correlations of presidential support with confirmation voting
were significant, except for the Stewart vote. Presidential support
was particularly important on the Fortas promotion, the Car-
swell nomination, and the Rehnquist and Bork votes.
Regional differences were also anticipated, with Southerners
more likely to oppose liberal nominations and support conser-
vative ones. The correlations of region with confirmation voting
were significant except for the Bork vote. Region impact was
greatest on the Stewart and Marshall votes. The signs of the
correlations show that Southern senators were less supportive of
the Harlan, Stewart, Marshall, Fortas, and Bork nominations
than were non-Southerners. Southerners were more likely to
oppose liberal nominations-counting the Eisenhower appointees
as liberal-and were most supportive of conservative ones, until
the Bork nomination, when Southerners were less supportive-
27% support in the South versus 46% in the non-South.
1988-891
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The foregoing analysis has shown some common patterns
and tested some of the basic hypotheses. A complete test of
these hypotheses requires, however, the use of multivariate anal-
ysis to determine which variables have independent explanatory
power when all of the others are controlled.
B. Multivariate Analysis
Ideology was expected to be the most important vote deter-
minant when the other variables were controlled. This hypothesis
will be checked with a multivariate analysis. Presidential support
is expected to operate differently, however, for members of the
president's party and the opposition party. Therefore, analyses
of all senators without the presidential support variable were
first performed and then the two parties were analyzed separately
including presidential support. The Harlan vote is excluded from
the multivariate analysis because of the unavailability of the
ideology indicator.
Table 4 reports the results of a multiple regression analysis
of each controversial vote on ideology, party, and region.36 With
these variables, the proportion of variance accounted for on the
eight votes ranges from 60 to 80 percentage points. Thus, voting
on confirmation of Supreme Court nominees during this period
was principally affected by ideology, party, and region.
Ideology had a significant effect on each of these confir-
mation votes. Party and region also had significant effects on
the Stewart, Marshall, and Bork votes, and region on the Hayn-
sworth rejection. The other four confirmation contests-Fortas,
Carswell, and two Rehnquist votes-seem purely ideological,
without independent contributions by party or region.
Region was the predominant influence on the first two votes-
Stewart and Marshall. Ideology was second most important and
party third on these votes, with all three exerting some inde-
pendent effects. In addition Southern conservative Democrats
were possibly opposing these nominations because of civil rights
issues.
36 A probit analysis would be more appropriate since the dependent variable is
dichotomous, but generally the results of such analysis are close to those of regression
analysis.
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Table 4
Multiple Regression Analysis of Confirmation Votes
Nomination
Stewart
Marshall
Fortas
Haynsworth
Carswell
Rehnquist
Rehnquist(CJ)
Bork
Ideology
- .32***
(4.11)
- .38***
(4.38)
- .77***
(9.20)
.72***
(7.92)
.84***
(10.31)
.81"***
(8.13)
.76***
(9.17)
.410**
(6.10)
Party
.25***
(3.05)
.32***
(3.97)
- .32
(0.41)
-. 02
(0.18)
-. 02
(0.25)
- .01
(0.16)
.12
(1.52)
.56***
(8.54)
with t-values
Region
- .67***
(9.61)
- .53***
(6.62)
-. 10
(1.32)
.18"*
(2.15)
.03
(0.38)
-. 06
(0.70)
.05
(0.84)
-. 15**
(2.74)
in parentheses.Entries are beta coefficients,
R2
0.77
0.67
0.69
0.65
0.72
0.60
0.76
0.79
Ideology was the most important of these vote predictors on
the next five controversial nominations-Fortas, Haynsworth,
Carswell, and two Rehnquist votes. Indeed, ideology was the
only significant influence on these votes, except for some re-
gional effect for Nixon's nomination of Haynsworth.
Only on the Bork vote was party affiliation the most pow-
erful predictor, which is somewhat inconsistent with the media's
conclusion that the Bork rejection resulted from intense ideolog-
ical polarization. Ideology was a fairly close second on the Bork
nomination. Region also had a small independent effect on the
Key:
*<.05
**<.01
<.001
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vote, but this time the Southern senators were less supportive
than Northerners, even though the nominee was conservative.
Table 5 gives the multiple regression analysis of the contro-
versial votes on ideology, region, and presidential support, con-
trolling for party. When controlling for party, the cases involving
less than 10% dissent within a party have been set aside.
Table 5
Multiple Regression, Controlled for Party
Nomination
Stewart
Marshall
Fortas
Haynsworth
Carswell
Rehnquist
Rehnquist(CJ)
Ideology
- .36**
(3.37)
- .53***
(5.07)
- .43**
(3.42)
.49***
(4.07)
.40
(1.98)
.79**
(2.93)
.80**
(3.41)
Democrats
Region
.60***
(6.73)
.42**
(4.22)
-. 09
(0.82)
- .42"***
(3.55)
-. 25
(1.99)
-. 13
(0.83)
.08
(0.74)
Republicans
Support
- .04***
(0.48)
- .05***
(0.64)
- .39
(2.99)
.03
(0.42)
.32*
(2.22)
-. 09
(0.42)
.01
(0.05)
R2
0.75
62 0.75
59 0.73
57 0.73
56 0.77
54 0.58
47 0.71
Fortas
Haynsworth
Carswell
Bork
Entries are beta
Key:
*<.05
*<.01
**< .001
- .80'*
(3.42)
.73***
(5.72)
.71*
(2.03)
.51**
(2.41)
coefficients,
.04 - .03 36 0.60
(0.31) (0.11)
.04 - .02 43 0.54
(0.38) (0.38)
.02 .02 41 0.58
(0.17) (0.17)
-. 21 .24 46 0.49
(1.90) (1.12)
with t-values in parentheses.
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Ideology was the most important predictor for both Repub-
licans and Democrats, except for the Stewart nomination where
region was most important for Democrats. Ideology was the
only significant factor for Republican senators on any of the
nominations. Presidential support was significant for Democrats
voting on Fortas and Carswell, where Democrats more generally
supportive of the president were more likely to support the
nomination than other Democrats. Region was significant for
Democratic senators only on the Stewart, Marshall, and Hayn-
sworth nominations.
In summary, only the ideology predictor had a consistently
large effect on all of the confirmation votes. Region and party
each affected only a few nominations, and presidential support
was even less of a factor across this time period.
Other factors certainly have been raised in some of the
nomination battles during this period-particularly questions as
to the nominee's ethics or competence. Ideology, party, and
region were least successful in accounting for voting on the
Rehnquist, Haynsworth, and Marshall nominations, which al-
lowed these other factors to exert their largest independent ef-
fects on those votes. That the analysis here accounts for 60Oo -
80% of the variance in the votes without inclusion of such
variables suggests, however, that their independent influence
must be minimal. More likely, such questions interact with the
factors analyzed here. For example, questions as to ethics or
competence may atfect the voting of members of the opposition
party more so than members of the president's party. After all,
members of the president's party are more likely to give the
nominee the benefit of the doubt and to view the charges as
politically motivated, while members of the opposition party
may use such questions as a pretext to justify their negative
votes.
What does this emphasis on ideology, region, and party
mean? These terms should be interpreted generally from a con-
stituency perspective. Thus, regional differences on the Harlan
and Stewart votes reflect constituents' demands on Southern
senators. Ideological effects signify differences in the constitu-
encies of liberal and conservative senators. This is not a meas-
urement of the independent effects of the senator's personal
ideology, rather, an illustration that senators who generally want
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their constituents to believe they support the liberal side voted
on confirmations differently from senators who find favor with
their constituents by taking conservative stands. Similarly, party
differences, as on the Bork vote, result in part from differences
in the constituencies which Republican and Democratic senators
represent, and particularly the need of many Democratic senators
to oppose Bork to remain in good stead with Democratic con-
stituents and liberal interest groups.
Ideology is most determinative of voting on these nomina-
tions, but senators are voting not on the ideology of the nominee
in a narrow sense but on the ideology of the nomination con-
test.17 That is, what matters to Senate confirmation voting is not
how liberal a Harlan or Bork would be on the Court versus the
policy wishes of the senators, but how ideological the nomination
is perceived within the broad political context. Such factors as
which seat on the Court is being filled are relevant to determining
this context. Senators view replacing a justice as more ideological
when the balance on the Court could be affected and less ideo-
logical when the replacement is needed to guarantee representa-
tion of some social group on the Court. Thus, ideological voting
does not mean that senators always judge the ideology of the
nominee, but that the political context of the nomination is
being evaluated ideologically.
C. Party and Committee Leadership Effects
Party differences are evident in nomination voting during
this period, but party had an independent effect only on the
Stewart, Marshall, and Bork votes. Because party differences
can result from the influence of the party and committee leaders,
the extent to which Democratic and Republican leaders took
different positions on these nine controversial votes will now be
examined. Leaders of the president's party are predicted to be
more supportive of nominations than those of the opposition
party.
Senate leaders often face particular difficulty in dealing with
Supreme Court nominations. Their states and re-election con-
17 See H. Weisberg & J. Felice, supra note 34.
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stituencies may prompt them to vote in one direction, but the
demands of their party (and their president if their party controls
the White House) can run in the opposite direction.
Table 6 summarizes the leadership votes. The Republican
leaders generally supported these Supreme Court nominations,
with a few notable exceptions. The only opposition to a Dem-
ocratic nominee resulted from the votes of Dirksen and Smith
against the elevation of Fortas to Chief Justice, signalling the
intense controversy on that vote. Republican leaders defied their
party's president in five votes. The three top Republican leaders
opposed Nixon's choice of Haynsworth, Margaret Chase Smith
voted against Carswell, and Chafee voted against the Bork nom-
ination.
Party leader
Knowland (Cal.)
Dirksen (Ill.)
Scott (Pa.)
Baker (Tenn.)
Dole (Kan.)
Minority whip
Saltonstall (Mass.)
Dirkson (Ill.)
Kuchel (Cal.)
Scott (Pa.)
Griffin (Mich.)
Stevens (Alas.)
Simpson (Wyo.)
conference chair
Milliken (Colo.)
Saltonstall (Mass.)
Smith (Maine)
Table 6
Votes of Party and Committee Leaders
Republicans
Yes
Harlan
Stewart & Marshall
Carswell & Rehnquist
Rehnquist (CJ) & Bork
Harlan
Stewart, Marshall,
& Fortas
Carswell & Rehnquist
Rehnquist (CJ) & Bork
Harlan
Stewart
Marshall & Rehnquist
No
Fortas
Haynsworth
Haynsworth
Fortas,
Haynsworth &
Carswell
Continued ....
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Table 6 Continued ....
Minority Whip Yes
Cotton (N.H.)
Curtis (Neb.)
Packwood (Oreg.) -
McClure (Id.)
Chafee (R.I.) Rehn
Judiciary comm. chair
Langer (N.D.)
Thurmond (S.C.) Rehn
Party leader
Johnson (Texas)
Mansfield (Mont.)
Byrd (W.Va.)
Clements (Ky.)
Mansfield (Mont.)
Humphrey (Minn.)
Long (La.)
Kennedy (Mass.)
Byrd (W.Va.)
Cranston (Cal.)
Judiciary comm. chair
Kilgore (W.Va.)
Eastland (Miss.)
quist (CJ)
quist (CJ)
Democrats
Harlan & Stewart
Marshall & Fortas
Harlan
Stewart
Rehnquist
Harlan
Haynsworth, Carswell,
& Rehnquist
Kennedy (Mass.)
Biden (Del.)
Bork
Haynsworth,
Carswell, &
Rehnquist
Rehnquist (CJ)
& Bork
Marshall &
Fortas
Haynsworth &
Carswell
Rehnquist (CJ)
& Bork
Stewart,
Marshall, &
Fortas
Bork
On the Democratic side, opposition to Supreme Court nom-
inations has been more prevalent: Mike Mansfield opposed all
three controversial Nixon appointments; Byrd voted against
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Rehnquist for Chief Justice (even though he had supported
Rehnquist for Associate Justice) and against Bork; Long op-
posed Johnson's nomination of Marshall and the cloture vote
on the Fortas promotion; Kennedy opposed Nixon's appoint-
ments of Carswell and Haynsworth; and Cranston opposed both
controversial Reagan nominations. As Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee chairmen, Eastland opposed three Eisenhower and John-
son nominees, and Biden opposed the Bork nomination. Overall,
the Democratic party and committee leadership voted with Dem-
ocratic presidents only 2 of the 6 times on controversial nomi-
nations, while voting against Republican presidents 11 of 20
times.
The leadership within the individual parties rarely united on
these votes. The Republican leaders split on the Fortas, Carswell,
and Bork nominations, while the Democratic leaders were split
on Stewart, Marshall, Haynsworth, Carswell, and the first Rehn-
quist vote. In three cases, the leadership of a party actually
united against a nominee: the Republican leadership opposed
Carswell, and the Democratic leadership opposed both Rehnquist
as Chief Justice and Bork. The Harlan nomination is the only
controversial vote where no party leader opposed the nominee.
Altogether, nearly one-third (9 of 28) of the leadership votes
on a nomination by presidents of their own party were negative,
compared to one-half (13 of 26) of the leadership votes on
nominations when the president was a member of the opposition
party. Thus, leaders are more likely to support presidents of
their party, but there is a considerable willingness of party and
committee leaders to oppose Supreme Court nominations even
when they share political affiliation with the president.
The leaders of the two parties were in most severe opposition
to one another over Rehnquist's promotion to Chief Justice,
with all Republican leaders in support of the nomination and all
Democratic leaders opposed to it. The leaders of the two parties
also disagreed on the Marshall and first Rehnquist votes (in both
cases Republicans united in favor but 2 of the 3 Democratic
leaders against), on the Carswell vote (Republican leaders split
but favored the nomination and Democratic split but opposed
the nomination), and on Bork's nomination (Democratic leaders
united against Bork but 2 of the 3 Republican leaders favored
the nomination). That the leaders of the two parties opposed
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one another on 4 of the most recent 5 controversial votes shows
that partisan factors may be becoming more important in Su-
preme Court confirmations.
CONCLUSION
The voting of senators in the past three decades on contro-
versial Supreme Court nominations is largely compatible with
an ideological interpretation. As would be expected, liberal sen-
ators have been more supportive of liberal nominations, and
conservative senators have been more supportive of conservative
nominations, showing that ideology is an important cue for
individual senators on nomination voting. Those ideological dif-
ferences generally remain strong when controlling for the influ-
ence of party, region, and presidential support. Party, region,
and presidential support are themselves significantly related to
confirmation voting during this period. These effects, however,
often disappear under controls, except for the importance of
region during the turmoil over civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s,
and except for the influence of party on the Bork rejection. In
many ways this latter result is the most intriguing, especially if
it leads to increased partisan polarization on Supreme Court
confirmation votes.
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